India, China entering a decade of uncertainty: Ex foreign secy Vijay Gokhale

You’ve made a very interesting argument in a recent paper about how China sees India…

My argument was that China felt most comfortable when there was a balance of power in the world. In 1990, when the Soviet Union collapsed, that balance of power disappeared. The US was the unquestioned global power. In these circumstances, the Chinese felt vulnerable. I argue that whenever there is no balance of power, the Chinese tend to take India more seriously because they need to have enough other countries with them to ensure a balance in the world. That is why, to my understanding, we saw a number of positive developments between India and China take place between 1990 and 2010. By 2010, the situation had begun to change, and the world had returned to a more balanced state. By this point, the threats had also reduced for China. It had normalized relations with the West, and it had outstripped India economically, diplomatically and militarily. As a result of this, China did not feel compelled to either clarify the LAC or resolve the boundary.

In your view, is the boundary dispute now intractable?

No dispute is intractable. In this case, we have an agreed three-step process, which is enshrined in the 2005 agreement. There are areas where the People’s Republic of China are in control. In my view, we have the ingredients for a negotiated settlement of the boundary question. What this will require is mutual political trust and goodwill, but that is lacking.

If the boundary question remains open, what will the future of India-China ties look like?

I would certainly say that we are entering a decade of uncertainty. That is not just because of developments between India and China but also because the global political and economic situation is uncertain. We are also in a situation where the momentum of China’s growth over the past 30 years is likely to keep the gap between India and China substantially wide in this decade. However, we equally need to be conscious of the fact that trends suggest that the Indian economy might play catch up in the longer term. The Chinese side cannot assume that the gap will not close towards the end of this decade. The equation that we saw in 2020 might not be the equation of 2030 as India’s growth continues to expand and China’s growth continues to slow down. India will have to be vigilant militarily and economically.

There seems to be widespread distrust of China in India. What, if anything, can China do to rebuild trust?

There are a few issues China can deal with that might at least set us back on the road to rebuilding mutual trust. First, there has to be a recognition that the boundary question is a central part of this relationship. China keeps saying that it is only a small part of the relationship and it needs to be put in an appropriate place. This sort of position is not helpful when the border has gained salience in the last four to five years for the government of India and the Indian public. Second, there is the issue of economic relations. Regrettably, we have had a one-way movement of goods between both countries, and the trade deficit has ballooned to an unacceptable $70 billion. China has dissimulated consistently when India has asked China to address this matter. I think the Chinese need to recognize that this unsustainable trade deficit is no longer simply a commercial issue or a market-driven issue. It is a political issue. Third, I think we do need to recognize that the Indo-Pacific as an idea is a uniquely Indian vision because it is rooted in our historical past. As India’s economy expands, we have begun to see the Indo-Pacific as a natural extension of our neighbourhood again. For the Chinese to suggest that this is some kind of an American plot to which naive Indians are subscribing is to insult Indian intelligence. It is important that the Chinese side recognize that India has a strong stake in peace, tranquillity and security and stability in the region.